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The aim of this paper was to critically review existing literature relating to, and 
critically analyse current conceptualisations of, ‘coaching philosophy’. The review 
reveals a bewildering approach to definitions, terms and frameworks that have limited 
explanation and reveal a lack of conceptual clarity. It is argued that rather than 
provide clarification and understanding the existing literature conflates coaching 
rhetoric and ideology with coaching philosophy and serves to reproduce existing 
coaching discourse rather than explain coaching practice. The paper problematises the 
unquestioned assumptions currently underpinning ‘coaching philosophy’; namely the 
overemphasis of coaches’ agency and reflexivity, the downplaying of the significance 
of social structure on coaches’ dispositions and the acceptance that coaching practice 
is an entirely conscious activity. The paper argues for an alternative philosophy of 
coaching that uses philosophic thinking to help coaches question existing ideology, 
and critically evaluate the assumptions and beliefs underpinning their practice. 
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A coach’s ‘philosophy’ above all else will inform their coaching (Cassidy, Jones, & 
Potrac, 2009; Lyle, 2002) and is argued to be central to understanding a coach’s 
behaviour (Cassidy et al., 2009; Jenkins, 2010; Jones, Armour, & Potrac, 2004; Lyle, 
2002; MaCallister, Blinde & Weiss, 2000; inter-alia). As such, ‘coaching philosophy’ 
is a topic of pre-eminence in numerous coaching books (e.g. Jenkins, 2010; Kidman 
& Hanrahan, 2011; Lyle, 1999; Martens, 2012; Vealey, 2005) and forms a core aspect 
of coach education (e.g. Cassidy et al., 2009; Gilbert & Trudel, 2005; Nelson & 
Cushion, 2006). The articulation of a ‘coaching philosophy’ and reflecting on its 
attributes may offer much for understanding and developing coaching practice 
(Cassidy et al., 2009; Jenkins, 2010). In reality, there remains a lack of engagement 
with this process, and this is due, in part, to what Cassidy et al. (2009) describe as 
“superficial and simplistic assumptions about the value of establishing and locating 
definitive philosophies” (p. 56).  
Understandably, coaches themselves get on with the business of coaching; one 
does not need to be a ‘philosopher of coaching’ in order to be a coach. There appears 
little drive from coaches to understand the philosophical status of coaching, nor to 
have any theoretical explanation of their practice (Partington & Cushion, 2013). 
Coaches often see little value in a philosophy as they attempt to cope with more 
tangible aspects of coaching practice, such as session content and organisation (Nash, 
Sproule & Horton, 2008). Therefore, coaches tend to prefer to ground their coaching 
in a ‘commonsense view’ (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Cushion, 2013) of experience and 
practice developing greater but unreflexive knowledge and understanding (Cushion, 
Armour & Jones, 2003). This has been conceptualised as coaches’ ‘practice theories’ 
(Cassidy 2010); that is, experience and a body of informal knowledge and developed 
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assumptions about coaching where these assumptions are viewed as ‘taken-for 
granted’ or ‘normal’ (Cassidy, 2010). As a result, the impetus for studying the basis of 
coaching and coaching knowledge does not come from coaches themselves (Gilbert, 
2007) but from researchers ‘outside’ coaching. Consequently, whatever the theoretical 
complexities of understanding coaching philosophy and coaching knowledge, many 
of the necessary intellectual questions are bound in personal research agendas, 
disciplinary outcomes and competition (Cushion & Lyle, 2010). Too frequently this 
has resulted in a fragmented field offering confusion, conflict and misdirection 
(Cushion & Lyle, 2010) and is particularly the case when considering ‘coaching 
philosophy’.  
While ‘philosophy’ is complex, diverse and difficult to define, its central 
concerns, issues and concepts are less so (Morgan, 2006). There are three themes that 
are central to philosophical enquiry: metaphysical questions that are concerned with 
the nature of reality (ontology), questions concerning the nature of knowledge 
(epistemology), and questions concerned with value (axiology) subdivided into ethics 
and aesthetics (Hardman & Jones, 2013; Morgan, 2006). These themes better position 
the argument to see, in an academic sense, the degree to which coaching has actually 
considered ‘philosophy’ and engaged with (or neglected) philosophic inquiry. 
Arguably, the ‘coaching philosophy’ literature, suffers from confusion, with a muddle 
of different languages used and a lack of consensus on the terms of reference. Authors 
often define ‘coaching philosophy’ in different ways (e.g. Bennie & O’Connor, 2010; 
Kidman & Hanrahan, 2011), without clear explanation of meaning or interpretation 
(e.g. Bennie & O’Conner, 2010; Camire, Trudel & Forneris, 2014) or without any 
explanation at all, assuming that they and the reader share a common understanding of 
the term (Cassidy, 2010) (e.g. McCallister et al., 2000; Voight & Carroll, 2006). A 
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central issue, therefore, is not just the complexity of philosophy or coaching, but also 
definitional and conceptual incoherence. 
As a result, in coaching there is a limited academic sense of philosophy or 
actual philosophic enquiry. Instead the term ‘philosophy’ represents a sense that 
shares more in common with taken-for-granted everyday usage as a view of ‘how 
things should be’ (Green, 2000). This is well illustrated perhaps through the 
conversational level phrase ‘my coaching philosophy is…’ Indeed, Flew (1984) 
suggests this shows the use of the term in a functional sense “a matter of standing 
back a little from the ephemeral urgencies to take an aphoristic overview that usually 
embraces both value-commitments and beliefs about the general nature of things” 
(p.vii), and it is this approach that is common to much of the coaching literature (e.g. 
Bennie & O’Connor, 2010; Collins, Barber, Moore, & Laws, 2011; Collins, Gould, 
Lauer, & Yongchul, 2009; MaCallister et al., 2000; Nash et al., 2008; Voight & 
Carroll, 2006). This is unsurprising as ‘coaching philosophy’ is currently grounded in, 
and reflective of, coaches’ practice that, in turn, is primarily driven by self-referenced 
anecdotal approaches based on ‘what works’ and what is perceived to ‘gets results’ 
(Cushion, 2013). In reality, coaches’ ‘practice theories’ or ‘philosophies’ are a social 
system of beliefs, structures and practices; an ideology, a systemised influence on the 
social construction of knowledge (Devis-Devis, 2006). The ‘coaching philosophy’ 
literature has failed to subject coaches’ beliefs and justifications of existing and on-
going practice to rational reconsideration, and instead conflated philosophies and 
ideologies. The outcome has been pseudo-principles and coaching rhetoric evidenced 
from coaching practice ideology reported as ‘coaching philosophies’ (e.g. Collins et 
al., 2011; MaCallister et al., 2000; Robbins, Houston, & Dummer, 2010; Voight & 
Carroll, 2006). Consequently, the ‘philosophies’ as described bear the hallmark of 
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particular ideologies rather than philosophies in the truest sense (Green, 2000) and the 
literature actually describes “a conceptually incoherent smorgasbord of esoteric 
positions, methodologies, and ideologies” (Grant, 2007, p.24) that does little to help 
academics or practitioners make sense of what underpins actions in practice. 
As a result, there remains a need to differentiate definitions of the nature and 
purpose of coaching and ideas about coaching held by coaches themselves. Thus 
distinguishing between philosophical attempts to make sense of this nature and 
purpose (abstract, detached and rational conceptualisations) from ideologies and the 
discourse of coaching (Green, 2000). However, this does not mean imposing the 
mode of thinking practiced by the academic observer fallaciously. Indeed, “reflection 
upon the social is itself a thoroughly philosophical activity” (Turnbull & Antalffy, 
2009, p.551) that can inform and transform practice (Cushion & Jones, 2014; Carr & 
Kemmis, 1986). Moreover, because definitions of coaching will depend on 
‘philosophy’, and the landscape of coaching can be viewed through a variety of 
philosophical lenses, there remains a need to provide for both practitioners and 
researchers a conceptual framework and common vocabulary to interrogate ‘coaching 
philosophies’ and understanding, and interpreting what is observable (Cassidy, 2010).  
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to provide a critical review of the 
literature concerned with ‘coaching philosophy’ enabling a clear overview of where 
scholarship concerning coaching philosophy ‘sits’ and allowing some of the gaps, 
problem areas and issues presented thus far to be clearly identified and arguments 
developed. Indeed, through such critical analysis, this review aims to provide a basis 
for understanding and disentangling some of the problems that have to date plagued 
the study of coaching philosophy. This, in turn, makes the character and assumptions 
of the work more accessible and increases the capacity for critical discussion. Such 
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discussion lends itself to reconsider critically the ‘philosophical’ study of coaching 
and the study of ‘coaching philosophy’ which remain haunted and hindered by 
fragmented and diverse approaches, unchallenged assumptions, often esoteric debates, 
and inconsistent theory building based on a dearth of empirical research. This task is a 
necessary preliminary for meaningful empirical enquiry into coaching and coaches’ 
philosophies. 
 
Current understanding of the term ‘coaching philosophy’  
It is argued that attempting to establish and identify a clear understanding of what 
underpins coaches’ actions allows a coach to utilise the practice activities that they 
believe is most effective for the learner in a complex coaching environment (Burton 
& Raedeke, 2008; Cassidy et al., 2009; Collins et al., 2009; Martens, 2012; Vealey, 
2005). For many, this underpinning is defined as a ‘coaching philosophy’ made up of 
a collective of values, beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, principles and priorities 
(Kidman & Hanrahan, 2011; Nash et al., 2008). It is this ‘philosophy’ that underpins 
everything a coach does (e.g. Careless & Douglas, 2011; Collins et al., 2009; Voight 
& Carroll, 2006). Collins et al. (2009) and Camire, Trudel and Forneris (2012) have 
argued that coaches ‘core values’ purposefully and singularly drive coaching 
philosophies. Thus, practice activity and behaviour are shaped by the coaches’ own 
individual coaching philosophy (Careless & Douglas, 2011).  
However, it is not uncommon for research to fail to define what is meant by a 
‘coaching philosophy’ (e.g. McCallister et al., 2000; Voight & Carroll, 2006). In 
McCallister et al.’s (2000) research examining the ‘philosophies’ of youth baseball 
and softball coaches no clear terms or definitions are provided, and it is not clear how 
‘coaching philosophy’ was defined to the participants in the study this was also the 
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case in Voight and Carroll (2006). Therefore, the authors of these studies assume a 
shared understanding of ‘coaching philosophy by their readers, while the findings are 
based on the coaches’ self-referenced perceptions of ‘coaching philosophy’.  
Where coaching ‘philosophy’ is outlined it is mainly described as a set of 
personal values and beliefs (e.g. Burton & Raedeke, 2008; Careless & Douglas, 2011; 
Kidman & Hanrahan, 2011; Nash et al., 2008). While there appears consensus on 
these core elements, a number of studies (e.g. Bennie & O’Connor, 2010; Nash et al., 
2008) discussing coaches’ values and beliefs do not explain these terms. For example, 
Nash et al. (2008) explored coaching philosophy by interviewing twenty-one coaches 
from a range of sports with different backgrounds and experience. However, the 
authors did not articulate their meaning of ‘coaching philosophy’, or their 
understanding of values or beliefs. Yet suggested that the “the development of a 
functional guide to coaching philosophy may be appropriate so that there is a global 
understanding of the term when it is used” (p.548). Similarly, Bennie and O’Connor 
(2010) interviewed six coaches and based on participant perceptions indentified 
components of a ‘coaching philosophy’ that included goals, actions, and values but 
also described an approach to coaching underpinned by personal qualities and skills. 
The author’s assumed a common understanding of these terms. More recently, 
Camire, Trudel & Forneris (2014) provided no definition of ‘coaching philosophy’, 
but drew on Nash et al. (2008) in discussing values and beliefs with no further 
explanation. Similarly Collins et al. (2011) analysed the written statements of thirty- 
five coaches and used a definition of ‘coaching philosophy’ from Martens (2012, p.5) 
as “beliefs or principles that help achieve your objectives”, again with no explanation 
of terms. In addition to values and beliefs, the ‘coaching philosophy’ literature argues 
for including additional components to form a ‘coaching philosophy’. For example, 
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Kidman and Hanrahan (2011) propose ‘personal objectives’; Cassidy et al. (2009) and 
Martens (2012) suggest ‘principles’.  
In defining a ‘coaching philosophy’ and its components, the literature appears 
to offer only a loose consensus rather than conceptual clarity; and within the 
consensus, there are few clear definitions. This is not helped by different definitions 
of the same terms. For example, Rokeach (1973) suggested a practice philosophy 
consists of beliefs (defined as a proposition or premise to be true), values (defined as 
an underpinning view of importance or worth of an object), attitudes and norms, 
whereas Burton & Raedeke (2008) suggest beliefs are “what dictate the way we view 
experiences in our lives” (p.4) and values are what “we hold in our lives” (p.4). 
To further muddy the waters, there is the consideration of the relationship 
between values and beliefs and how this is defined. For example, work on the nature 
of human values and beliefs suggest that a philosophy is a framework that clarifies the 
relationship between values and beliefs, where coach’s values are more deeply held 
and underpin their beliefs (e.g. Burton & Raedeke, 2008; Lyle, 1999; Lyle, 2002). For 
example, Lyle (1999) used content analysis to identify the coaching philosophies of 
forty-three senior coaches including twenty-four ‘values’ common to all forty-three 
coaches (for example, personal growth, respect for others and partnership). These, he 
argued, underpinned beliefs and behaviours that, in turn, characterised the coach’s 
practice. Conversely, other authors (e.g. Hardman & Jones, 2013; Kidman & 
Hanrahan, 2011) suggest that values and beliefs work independently of each other. In 
this case, a coach’s values and beliefs are related yet separately organised into a 
hierarchy of importance, with personal or social values taking priority (Jenkins, 2010) 
with variation according to the individual coach, their athletes and the social context. 
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Jenkins (2010) analysis adopts Rokeach’s (1973) description of values where a 
human value system is an enduring organisation of three types of beliefs; descriptive 
or existential (i.e. capable of being true or false); evaluative (i.e. judged to be good or 
bad); prescriptive or proscriptive (i.e. some means or end of action is judged to be 
desirable or undesirable). These values are then split into personal and social values 
(self-centred or society-centred/intrapersonal or interpersonal in focus), or moral 
(refer mainly to modes of behaviour) and competence values. In this sense, a 
‘coaching philosophy’ would, therefore, be a value system made up of different types 
of beliefs (descriptive/existential, evaluative, and proscriptive). 
A recurrent theme is a failure to define clearly the terms used, whether that is 
of ‘coaching philosophy’ itself or the components thereof. Perhaps more importantly 
authors do not articulate if participant understanding of ‘coaching philosophy’ was 
assumed, a definition provided, or if data were collected based upon participant 
perceptions alone. Authors also fail to acknowledge that their own criteria and 
questions for identifying a coaching philosophy have a particular worldview or 
philosophical position (e.g. Cassidy et al., 2009). Moreover, despite values and beliefs 
being identified as a key part of a coaching ‘philosophy’ (e.g. Burton & Raedeke, 
2008; Kidman & Hanrahan, 2011; Lyle, 2002) existing work does not define clearly 
these terms nor explicate the relationship between the two. Furthermore, aside from 
Jenkins (2010), authors offer little insight into how values and beliefs might be 
categorised, or the characteristics of such categories. Lastly, despite a plethora of 
book chapters and position papers, there is limited empirical research investigating 
coaches’ values and beliefs and how these may translate into practice despite the 
repeated assertions of the importance of understanding ‘coaching philosophy’.  
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Current research – Coaching philosophy: coaching rhetoric, ideology and 
discourse   
A critical question when considering the existing research is the degree to which it 
actually evidences a ‘coaching philosophy’? The current crop of ‘coaching 
philosophy’ literature is largely descriptive rather than analytical; it is uncritically 
accepting and describes coaches’ personal preferences (e.g. Burton & Raedeke, 2008; 
Vealey, 2005). In addition, although limited in number, empirical studies conducted 
in coaching (e.g. Nash et al., 2008; Robbins et al., 2010) tend to identify coaches’ 
different perceptions of philosophies. Such findings are far from philosophical in 
nature, and instead, are largely the reproduction of coaching rhetoric, truisms and 
value-laden ideologies (e.g. Bennie & O’Connor, 2010; Collins et al., 2011; Schempp, 
McCullick, Busch, Webster, & Mason, 2006). This research has offered little in the 
way of critical, philosophical analysis and has even less to say about the complex 
production of coaching discourse.  
As a system of ideas, beliefs, values, commitments, pattern of thought, and social 
practice, ideology operates between individuals and structures dialectically to 
reproduce and maintain social characteristics (Devis-Devis, 2006). Ideology is two-
fold; firstly, it functions as a shared system of symbols and social practice without 
which any social situation would be incomprehensible; and secondly, as a system 
embedded in power relationships and sedimented forms of thought in everyday life 
that can distort communication and understanding (Devis-Devis, 2006). Coaching is a 
social system of beliefs, structures and practices, and its ideologies, that appear 
natural, obvious and commonsense, exercise a systemised influence on the social 
construction of knowledge of coaches to produce a particular coaching discourse. 
Discourses are shaped by “beliefs and commitments, explicit ideologies, tacit world 
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views, linguistics and cultural systems, politics and economics, and power 
arrangements” (Cherryholmes, 1988, p.106). They are the prevailing “set of 
meanings, metaphors representations, images stories [and] statements that, in some 
way, together produce a particular version” of coaching (Burr, 1995, p.48). For 
example, commonly reported ideological coaching discourse includes: “in order to 
succeed, a coach needs be able to relate to players both as footballers and, more 
importantly, as individuals” (p.12), “any corrective feedback to players must be 
accompanied by a positive input” (p.14) and “effective coaching comes from 
watching and learning from others” (Jones et al., 2004, p.19).  
Moreover, the language of sports coaching is a performance ‘discourse of 
expertise’ (Cassidy et al., 2009), where coaching is focused around the individual and 
is positioned as the development of expertise, where athletes and coaches are 
empowered by their goal orientation and the self-chosen means to achieve it (Johns & 
Johns, 2000). As a result, coaching is driven by a self-referenced anecdotal approach 
to practice based on ‘what works’, and a way of coaching that ‘gets results’ (Cushion, 
2013). Bruner (1999) describes such implicit theories as ‘folk pedagogies’; i.e. strong 
views about how people learn and what is ‘good’ for them. Typically, these are based 
on “tradition, circumstance and external authority” (Tinning, 1988, p. 82). Coaching 
ideologies and dogma are the frameworks producing and reproducing ‘folk 
pedagogies’ (Cushion & Jones, 2014; Piggott, 2011) resulting in practice and 
practitioners becoming, as Piggott (2011) suggests, “dogmatic and petrified because 
they are protected” and resistant to “criticism from within and without” (p.8).  
Coaching, then, is an ideologically determined practice, and for coaches (and 
researchers) is perceived as universal, rational and obvious (e.g. Nash et al., 2008; 
Robbins et al., 2010; Schempp et al., 2006). Coaching thus retains a tacitly understood 
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persistent and resilient culture where ideology endures partly because it contains 
elements that both coaches and researchers recognise as accurate in their experience 
(Eagleton, 1991). Against this backdrop, coaches are left to define their own 
‘coaching philosophy’. When this occurs it does so within coaching’s culture 
(Cushion & Jones, 2014), where coaches’ come to accept and value certain types of 
knowledge over others and perpetuate these perspectives through practice (Cushion et 
al., 2003). This, in turn, creates a highly contextual discourse with that imposes and 
enforces a ‘correct way’ to coach (Cushion 2013; Cushion & Jones, 2014). As a 
result, coaches authenticate certain types of collective knowledge with the resulting 
discourse giving certain practices an entrenched legitimacy (Cushion et al., 2003; cf. 
Cushion & Jones, 2014). Prior socialisation along with established beliefs and 
traditions reinforce this ‘valid’ image of coaching (Potrac, Jones & Cushion, 2007).  
Thus, the coaching process and coaching research, by reporting it, nourishes 
and maintains ideology through the imposition of language, meanings and symbolic 
systems that actually support certain segmented ways of understanding and ordering 
coaching i.e. coaching philosophies. Both coaching and coaching research appear 
guilty of ‘misrecognising’ the arbitrary nature of the culture (Cushion, 2013), and 
serve to reproduce existing ideology while caught in its ideological web (e.g. Camire, 
Trudel & Forneris, 2012; Nash et al., 2008). Moreover, existing research and coach 
education does not address issues related to beliefs and assumptions about coaching 
and learning in a meaningful way (Cushion, 2013; Nelson, Cushion & Potrac, 2011), 
or how these impact practice (Camire et al., 2012; Gilbert & Trudel, 2005). Far from 
being benign activities, coaching practice, coach education and coaching research 
always contain and advance values and agendas (Cushion & Jones, 2014). Indeed, 
rather than leading coaches and coach education in understanding underlying 
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‘ideologies’, existing research contributes to these issues through its perpetuation of 
existing coaching discourse and its lack of conceptual clarity. Consequently, the 
‘coaching philosophies’ currently described are not philosophical in nature (in the 
sense of being abstract, detached and rational conceptualisations of coaching) 
(Armour, 1997), but merely what Green (2002) calls “mythical ideas regarding the 
supposed worth of their subject” (p.65).  
 
Problematising ‘Coaching Philosophy’ 
Like the wider coaching literature, the existing research concerning ‘coaching 
philosophy’ is as Jones, Edwards and Filho (2014) argue “starved of contextual 
considerations”, yet replete with hollow “complex-aware rhetoric” (p. 2). Indeed, the 
dominant psychologism and individualism of humanistic discourse running through 
the coaching literature makes a number of assumptions about coaches, coaching and 
coaching philosophy that remain unchallenged. These include: the assumption that 
knowledge and skills are neutral rather than socially and culturally constructed; 
experience is seen as a given and the source of authentic knowledge, and not in any 
way problematic; and that there is a true self which exists independently of the social 
realm. Consequently, ‘coaching philosophy’ is presented as a “logical chain of 
propositions that can be developed into a system of knowledge” (Jones et al., 2014, 
p.3) that, in turn, underpins and explains practice unproblematically (e.g. Grecic & 
Collins, 2013). The growing corpus of writing concerning ‘coaching philosophy’ fails 
repeatedly to take any critical standpoint toward these assumptions, nor does it 
question or problematise the notion of a ‘coaching philosophy’, instead providing 
legitimacy to the concept and defending the grounds for developing and articulating it 
(e.g. Cassidy et al., 2009; Lyle, 2002).  
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 Rather than just representing ‘coaching ideology’, the literature (and coach 
education) instead presents and perpetuates an ideology of coaching philosophy.  This 
ideology acts as a structure for coaching identities and is legitimised as a valid 
explanation for coaches’ thoughts and actions. As Althusser (1971) suggests, ideology 
enables coaches to reconstruct in an imaginary plane, a coherent discourse that can 
operate as the skyline of their lived experience, and gives shape to a social process 
that, in turn, helps place them in their particular social formation. Ideology has an 
opaque character; it impacts the rational perceptions of individuals regarding social 
practices and helps individual coaches articulate a normative framework and 
behaviour to orient their practices (Torres, 1999). Coaching philosophy, then, is itself 
an ideological structure, “a system of representations by which social agents express a 
particular mode of appraising reality, codifying information and processing practical 
outcomes” (Torres, 1999, p. 108).  
Coaching philosophy ideology has its roots in the epistemological foundations 
of Cartesian rationality and assumes reflexivity, the ability to see oneself as object, as 
a defining characteristic where this self-awareness can generate valid knowledge 
(Fendler, 2003). As Fendler (2003) asserts Cartesian assumptions are enacted when 
the practices related to coaching philosophy express an Enlightenment-optimism 
about the potential for human rationality. In a Cartesian scheme of self-awareness, the 
self plays simultaneously the role of subject-who-reflects and the object that is 
reflected upon (Nadler, 1989). This notion of self-awareness in coaching philosophy 
ideology is extended to mean that this reflexive self has agency, has the ability to 
make rational choices and assumes responsibility for decisions and actions. However, 
conflating coaching philosophy with rational choice assumes equality for all coaches, 
and a level playing field of practice, thus developing a ‘coaching philosophy’ 
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becomes formalised in instrumental terms where everyone who goes through the steps 
will arrive at the same place. This construction is problematic as it ignores the social 
beyond the interactional (Jones et al., 2014) through not recognising the effects of 
socialisation, power, history and culture on subjectivity, and on the ways it is possible 
to be aware of ourselves as subjects and objects (Fendler, 2003), while at the same 
time overemphasising coaches’ agency, power, conscious action and reflexivity. The 
result is the uncritical presentation of a fixed and stable individual, a transcendent, 
unproblematised, self-aware and reflexive coach with a ‘unique’ philosophy that 
explains and underpins their practice.  
Yet life interpretation with practical sense and objectified explanation are two 
distinct sides of human endeavour (Callewaert, 1999). Thus, the ideology of coaching 
philosophy is a contrived masquerade to manipulate agent and structure and theory 
and practice into one single discourse. Rather than a meta-theoretical reflexivity on 
coaching practice, coaching philosophy is currently misunderstood as a constitutive 
part of the object, the ideology of coaching philosophy would have us believe that the 
subjective experience and practical knowledge at work in the mind of the coach is an 
objectified explanation of practice (e.g. Lyle, 2002 inter-alia). However, subjective 
experience and knowledge has already been shaped by historical and cultural 
circumstances and ideology, and subjective perceptions are effects of historical 
contexts (Fendler, 1999). The relationship between the social and the individual is 
therefore overlooked as coaches’ practice takes place in a given social context and 
coaches’ make meaning of their existence from the sporting cultures that they inhabit, 
they are part of the structure, and the structure is part of them (Cushion & Jones, 
2014). Thus, the individual coach alone is an inadequate unit of analysis to understand 
coaching, and the ideology of coaching philosophy results in the true meaning of 
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‘philosophy’ and the connections with social structure being overlooked. By not 
problematising subjective experience and the significance of ideology, coaches lose 
critical leverage and a means of reinterpreting and reassessing the nature of their 
experiences. Indeed, through the ideology of coaching philosophy, a drive to discover 
the ‘truth’ about practice and find coherent subjectivities results in a process that is 
actually disempowering. 
The ideology of coaching philosophy also assumes that practice is an entirely 
conscious activity and available for reflexive scrutiny. However, only a small part of 
human experiences is retained in consciousness with experiences become sedimented 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and coaching practices originally learned as part of a 
conscious process, become remembered as a habitual response (Cushion & Jones, 
2014). Lessons are absorbed that become so ingrained they are forgotten in any 
conscious sense (Jarvie & Maguire, 1994) therefore coaches have learned and 
acquired a set of practical cultural competencies, including a social identity; these are 
dispositions that operate “below the level of consciousness and language, beyond the 
reach of introspective scrutiny and control by the will” (Bourdieu, 1984, p.466). 
Coaching practice, therefore, is not wholly consciously organised or orchestrated, as 
Jenkins argues (2002); there is a practical sense and/or logic “a mastery acquired by 
experience of the game, and one which works outside conscious control” (Bourdieu, 
1990, p.13). Practical logic is fluid and indeterminate and not accomplished on the 
basis of normative models, coaching is therefore an improvisatory practice (Cushion 
& Jones, 2014). As a result, it would be a mistake to see coaches’ actions as entirely 
conscious. Moreover, as practice is rooted in both past and present positions and 
experience, as well as being located in social structure external to them, coaches’ 
espoused values and beliefs are more likely simplified statements of interpretation 
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rather than the actual cause of their thoughts and actions (Hodkinson & Hodkinson, 
2004). Yet, the ‘coaching philosophy’ literature is unanimous in agreeing that coaches 
possess the capacity to identify, understand and articulate the determinants of their 
practice in its entirety; that is, that coaches do possess the capacity to function as 
entirely conscious and reflexive beings. 
Currently, coaches appear to identify with the ideology of ‘coaching 
philosophy’, but in this sense, it could be argued that it is neither coaching nor 
philosophy. Yet, if a person does not have a ‘coaching philosophy’, then they cannot 
be a true coach (e.g. Cassidy et al., 2009; Lyle, 2002; Nash et al., 2008). The 
descriptive language produced acts to normalise how a coach should be (e.g. Jenkins, 
2010; Lyle, 2002, inter-alia). Culturally and ideologically driven descriptors correlate 
the ideology and culture with certain coaching activities and practices, the language 
sets up certain expectations about behaviour and practice, the descriptors connect 
coaching to identity, constructing language to understand and identify self; and the 
descriptors by omission obliterate alternative perceptions that are not based on 
prevailing dominant culture or ideology (Cushion, 2013). As a result, the existing 
research defends and promotes the legitimacy of the ideology while offering little 
insight, either implicitly or empirically, into the objectivities and subjectivities that 
produce and reproduce coaching practice.  
However, coaching philosophy, or rather, philosophical contemplation can 
provide coaches with the tools to deconstruct who they think they are and the social 
conditions that govern their development and existence. Such a reflexive process 
should expose the social and cultural embeddedness and taken-for-granted 
assumptions in which the coach is located, and encourage alternative readings of the 
text of experience (Tennant, 1999). Philosophy and philosophic thinking therefore 
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offers a means of enlightening coaches about the ideology of ‘coaching philosophy’ 
and the limits on their thinking and practice. 
 
Philosophy of coaching – the role of philosophic enquiry   
All practical activities are guided by theory; coaching is a performed social practice 
that can only be understood by reference to the framework of thought in terms of 
which practitioners make sense of what they are doing (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; 
Brookbank & Magill, 2007). As Carr and Kemmis (1986) argue, “the assumption that 
all ‘theory’ is non-practical and all ‘practice’ is non-theoretical is entirely misguided” 
(p.113). The coaches’ role is the product of existing and ongoing negotiations about 
coaching where coaching norms provide an overriding, powerful, and historical view 
of what coaches should do and what coaching should look like (Cushion, 2013; 
Cushion et al., 2003; Light, 2004). This results in the development of a set of beliefs, 
attitudes, and expectations about coaching and the nature of a ‘philosophy’. Though 
acquired in a subconscious manner, rather than ‘taught theoretical practice’, this is 
still a prescribed way of thinking that remains informed by assumptions (Carr & 
Kemmis, 1986) that have axiological, ontological and epistemological underpinnings. 
Thus, coaches’ (and some researchers) understanding of an apparent theory-practice 
gap is instead illustrative of a lacking in critical appraisal of the adequacy of concepts, 
beliefs and assumptions about coaching incorporated within prevailing practice 
theories. Therefore, by subjecting beliefs and justifications of existing and on-going 
practice to abstract rational and detached (i.e. philosophical) reconsideration, theory 
can in fact inform and transform practice by informing and transforming the ways in 
which practice is experienced and understood (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Cushion, 2013; 
Cushion & Jones, 2014). As Carr and Kemmis (1986) argue, the transition is not from 
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theory to practice as such, but rather from irrationality to rationality, from ignorance 
and habit to knowledge and reflection.  
Rather than simply reciting them, unpacking assumptions and beliefs 
emancipates practitioners from their dependence on habit and tradition by providing 
them with resources to enable reflection and to critically examine the inadequacies of 
different conceptions of practice (Carr & Kemmis, 1986). However, as Cushion 
(2013) argues, this is largely beyond existing conceptions of coach education (Nelson 
et al., 2011), which is additive (grafting new ‘skills’/knowledge onto an existing 
repertoire) rather than critically transformative (deconstructing taken-for-granted 
beliefs, assumptions, knowledge and habits, and rebuilding practice) (Thompson & 
Zueli, 1999). Therefore, coaches are not engaged in meaningful reflection about their 
underlying beliefs but instead evidence pragmatic practice utilitarianism (Grant, 
2007). Such an uncritical approach leaves coaching closed to objective enquiry 
around the outcomes (intended and unintended) of adopted methodologies. Moreover, 
coaches, coach educators and sports organizations have a tendency to ‘cherry pick’ 
ideas that fit these unchallenged ‘beliefs’, while rejecting or resisting others that are 
more challenging (Jones et al., 2014; Light & Evans, 2010; Roberts, 2011). The 
resulting application of pseudo-principles and coaching myths are not only evidenced 
in coaching practice ideology but are also included in coach education ideologies and 
rhetoric (e.g. Roberts, 2011); and become affirmed and reproduced through the 
uncritical reporting of ‘coaching philosophy’ (e.g. Jones et al., 2004; c.f. Cushion, 
2013). 
However, it could be suggested that this lack of work from researchers and in 
coach education is in part due to the difficulty of identifying the often implicit, 
ontological, epistemological beliefs and axiological, ethical values deeply embedded 
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within coaches. However, rather than being comprehensive, the literature remains 
largely superficial and descriptive, while philosophical questions that can be the most 
“complex and frustrating of all” (Hardman & Jones, 2013, p.105) are just not posed 
(e.g. Martens, 2012; McCallister et al., 2000; Kidman & Hanrahan, 2011; Voight & 
Caroll, 2006). A more philosophical approach suggests more in-depth exploration 
relating to axiology, which include values of importance; ethics which include moral 
values; ontology which include beliefs about the nature of existence, including a core 
set of features to coaching that provide personal significance and a central source of 
meaning; self-understanding, social expression and self-esteem to that person 
(Hardman & Jones, 2013); and epistemological assumptions that include beliefs on 
the nature of knowledge (Light, 2008). All coaches’ practice narratives contain 
underpinning ontological and epistemological beliefs that informs their assumptions 
about learning that, in turn, influences the types of coaching methods and practice 
activities used (Jones et al., 2004; Light, 2008).  
There is a need for an empirical philosophical understanding to support coach 
education and coaches (Collins et al., 2009; Hardman & Jones, 2013; Jenkins, 2010). 
Philosophical reflection can help establish a rationale for action and provide the tools 
to deal with questions in a clear and justified way (Drewe, 2000). While recognising 
the problems with making the tacit explicit, coaches themselves can be encouraged to 
use philosophical ‘tools’ to develop a more coherent and sophisticated understanding 
of their own coaching and coaching in general (Hardman & Jones, 2013).  
The methodology used most frequently to attempt this process has been coach 
interviews (e.g. Bennie & O’Connor, 2010; Camire et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2004; 
MaCallister et al., 2000; Nash et al., 2008; Robbins et al., 2010) with the research 
tending to investigate elite coaches in performance contexts (e.g. Collins et al., 2009; 
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Jones et al., 2004; Voight & Carroll, 2006). Researchers have also utilised 
questionnaires (e.g. Debanne & Laffaye, 2013; Pratt & Eitzen, 1989) and document 
analysis of personal statements or reflective writing (e.g. Collins et al., 2011; Lyle, 
2002; Schempp et al., 2006) to attempt to understand coaches’ perceptions of their 
practice and their ‘philosophy’. In addition, in addressing its research questions the 
coaching philosophy research has tended to use single rather than multiple or mixed 
method research designs (i.e. Bennie & O’Connor, 2010; Careless & Douglas, 2011; 
Collins et al., 2011; Nash et al., 2008; Robbins et al., 2010; Voight & Carroll, 2006).  
Irrespective of methodology however, all authors assume that coaches’ values, 
beliefs and practices are entirely conscious entities and infer that coaches consciously 
construct and live out their philosophies; while elite coaches appear to be sampled on 
the inference (e.g. Cassidy et al., 2009; Nash et al., 2008) that more experience brings 
more capacity for reflexivity. While acknowledging that often coaches do not have 
sufficient philosophical understanding to articulate the values underpinning their 
thoughts and actions (Lyle, 2002), researchers present a paradox, assuming that 
‘expert’ coaches naturally become more reflexive but continue to stress the need to 
‘trigger’ coaches internal conversations through questioning (e.g. Cassidy et al., 2009; 
Nash et al., 2008) without articulating the assumptions underpinning such questions.   
There is a recognition in the literature that beliefs are framed over time, often 
early in the life course and are inextricably linked to biography (Armour, 2004; 
Cassidy et al., 2009). As a result, linking practice to biography, that includes a 
temporal element, seems an important methodological step (Armour, 2004). To this 
end, the use of story telling and the identification of critical incidents have been 
advocated (Careless & Douglas, 2011; Jenkins, 2010). Moreover, Bourdieu (2000, p. 
50) insisted that in order to ‘encounter’ rather than reassemble the social, we should 
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move close to the site of practice and production, social practice, cannot be 
understood without an appreciation of practice itself (Cushion & Jones, 2014). In 
teaching, Green (1998) argued that “if we wish to understand teachers’ ‘philosophies’ 
of PE, then we must study them not as abstract philosophical systems of ideas, but 
rather as practical, everyday ‘philosophies’ which provide practical guides to action as 
well as a justification for those actions” (p. 141). While Tsangaridou and O’Sullivan 
(2003) go on to suggest, “the only way to determine teacher’s theories-in-use may be 
through observations of these professional practices” (p.133). However, practice, as a 
visible social phenomenon, cannot be understood outside of time and any adequate 
analysis of practice must treat temporality as a central feature (Jenkins, 2002). These 
arguments suggest that any philosophic investigation must be conducted over time 
(i.e. longitudinally), be based in-situ (grounded in practice), and use a range of 
methods to highlight and attempt to move beyond coaches’ subjective perceptions.  
 
Some conclusions 
Hardman and Jones (2013) remain the only scholars to acknowledge and integrate 
legitimate philosophical thinking into a discussion concerning ‘coaching philosophy’. 
They recognise that philosophy is more complex than a selection of statements 
concerning the circumstances and dilemmas of coaching practice (Hardman & Jones, 
2013). Through the portrayal of the objective nature of philosophical thought the 
authors challenge the commonly accepted depiction of coaches’ philosophies as 
entirely subjective and counter coaches’ claims of ‘exclusivity’. However, the authors 
paint a utopian picture of coaching philosophy that privileges the ideas of morality, 
and this work remains a philosophical discussion rather than empirical philosophical 
enquiry. Of the empirical work carried there remains significant conceptual 
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incoherence and confusion where “coaches notions of their philosophies appear more 
ideological than philosophical” (Cassidy et al., 2009, p.58). In addition, this paper has 
attempted to problematise the assumptions underlying coaching philosophy and 
instead argued that what is currently presented as coaching philosophy is itself an 
ideology. Coaching scholars are culpable in producing and reproducing this ideology 
as research repeatedly legitimises coaching philosophy as a valid unproblematised 
explanation of coaches’ thoughts and action. This ideology overemphasises coaches’ 
agency and conscious action and reflexivity, while underestimating the significance of 
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